What is Plan B? And how will the U.S. shift to it?

The Iraqi parliament promises to meet tomorrow, hoping to at least be able to choose a permanent speaker for itself and perhaps fill a few other minor posts. The standoff over who will be the next prime minister continues. This unsolved controversy in turn is blocking the final selection of a president, two vice-presidents, and perhaps deputy parliament speakers.

In spite of the chaos reigning in the greater Baghdad area and Anbar province, Iraqi political developments are completely frozen. The article cited above reports that Mr. Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, has insisted on the parliamentary session tomorrow. Perhaps Mr. Khalilzad hopes that parliament will once and for all dispose of Mr. Ibrahim al-Jaafari as the Shi’ite bloc nominee for prime minister, thus clearing the way for other more acceptable nominees to be considered. It is a risky strategy; the Shi’ites, in their ensuing anger, could walk out, or equivalently, reject all nominees for other posts, such as Mr. Talabani for president. Mr. Khalilzad must believe that it is worth the try – more waiting isn’t accomplishing anything other than discrediting Iraqi politicians and the rest of the Iraq project back in Washington, D.C. With time running out, it is time for Mr. Khalilzad to throw the metaphorical “Hail Mary” pass.

Like almost all such passes, this one too is not likely to score. Then what? How long should the Coalition’s decision-makers wait for final proof that Iraq’s politicians cannot cooperate enough to form a government, let alone actually govern effectively? When should the U.S. shift to Plan B? What is Plan B? And how does the U.S. shift to it without losing too much face – and also retain a capacity to achieve its anti-terrorism objectives?

America’s Plan A in Iraq is to establish an elected, legitimate, and functioning Iraqi government, which the U.S. and the rest of the Coalition would support, mostly with technical advisors embedded in the security services and ministries. The U.S. government is obviously in no position to admit to a Plan B.

Our Plan B is for the U.S. military to fall back to supporting friendly and useful tribes in Iraq, which, after all, are the basic political units there and in much of the world (we called this The War on Terror, version 2.0, and discussed the concept again here). The U.S. would use its military advisors, logistics capability, and air power to provide security to allied tribes inside Iraq. In exchange, these tribes would assist the U.S. in hunting down in Iraq, and beyond, Al Qaeda and WMD sanctuaries. The U.S. can protect its interests and its friends in Iraq even if Iraq’s politicians cannot establish a parliamentary democracy. With the grass-roots relationships U.S. military personnel have established with many Iraqis over the past three years, such an approach could be highly effective, even if it isn’t the most desirable outcome for Iraq as a nation.

The greatest problem transitioning to Plan B lies back in Washington, D.C. It will be exceedingly painful for the Bush administration to admit that Iraq’s political class has failed. Of course, the Administration is under no obligation to publicly admit such a thing, but it will also be exceedingly embarrassing to explain away why five, six, nine, twelve months have gone by in Iraq since the general election without a government forming.

The transition from Plan A to Plan B, the War on Terror 2.0, will thus be difficult and delicate to execute. The U.S. will require a new logistics system inside Iraq. It will have to move, sometimes under fire, most of its conventional maneuver units out of the country. At the same time, it will have to redistribute its special operations and advisor resources. All of this would occur during a period of even more intense violence, chaos, and political upheaval inside Iraq.

Abandoning Iraqi democracy will be traumatic all around. The Bush Doctrine, and its attempt to modernize Arab and Islamic societies, is a quintessentially American idea and had to be tried if only to be disproved. The American blood and anguish in Iraq came not from toppling Saddam’s government, but from the idealistic effort to bring democracy and self-government to the tribal Iraqi culture. If events prove that this is not possible, as Iraq’s politicians may so demonstrate within a few days or weeks, at least the U.S. government and electorate will be clear about what doesn’t work. Then they can get on with trying a new approach that promises better results, at least for American interests.