Learning lessons in Baquba

For the past ten days or so, Colonel Steve Townsend, USA and his brigade have led the attack against an Al Qaeda stronghold in western Baquba, Iraq. Colonel Townsend held a press conference which Mr. Michael Gordon from the New York Times covered. Colonel Townsend was candid in his assessment of the battle:

“We are on our way to securing the population of Baquba, which is what we came here to do,” said the colonel, who commands the Third Stryker Brigade Combat Team of the Second Infantry Division. “I am pretty satisfied, with the exception of my own goal to kill and capture as many as possible so we don’t have to fight them somewhere else.”

[…]

Colonel Townsend said reports from the field showed that there were more than 100 insurgent casualties; his conservative count was that 49 of them had been killed. More than 60 suspected insurgents have also been captured, he added.

“When I came here I thought there were 300 to 500 fighters in there because that is what the intelligence told me,” he said. “Does that mean that half or more eluded us? I guess it does.”

[…]

Colonel Townsend said that the fight was not drawing to a close and that he expected the insurgents to carry out fresh attacks. “The enemy has done what I would do in his shoes,” he said. “He has largely tried to melt away after putting up initial resistance. So, yes, I expect the enemy will come back.”

[…]

Beyond that, some insurgents appeared to have been tipped off, he said. “Then we have reason to believe that some left immediately prior to the operation,” he said. “How they got that word I don’t know.”

[…]

The longer-term effect of the assault remains to be seen, but Colonel Townsend described an operation that disrupted the insurgents without delivering a knockout blow.

“They will go somewhere else and they will start building a new network,” he said. “I think they are more vulnerable when they are on the move.”

In spite of the U.S. command’s efforts to cut off the city prior to the battle and thus trap the terrorists inside, the Battle of Baquba did not meet Colonel Townsend’s expectations. Are there any lessons we can learn from this experience?

In this article from the Small Wars Journal blog, Mr. Dave Kilcullen, a counterinsurgency advisor to the military command in Iraq, explains that it is success enough to separate the insurgent enemy from the general population, which the insurgents need for support and protection. From this perspective, the apparently meager results from the Battle of Baquba are really an important incremental success in a larger counterinsurgency strategy.

This would be true only if American formations such as Colonel Townsend’s Stryker brigade had a nearly limitless amount of time and resources to continue this sort of gradual wearing down of the enemy. Unfortunately, modern American culture is particularly unsuited for this very type of mission, a characteristic well known to the enemy. Highly skilled, equipped, and motivated as they may be, American combat units such as Colonel Townsend’s are not the right tool for a maintenance task that will likely take another ten years to accomplish.

As Mr. Kilcullen himself makes clear, it is only the Iraqis themselves that can complete the task of eradicating extremists such as al Qaeda from their country. Is there some segment of Iraqi society that can produce a fighting force that is technically competent, motivated, incorruptible, and effective against opponents like al Qaeda?

The U.S. would like the Iraqi government to be the segment of Iraqi society that provides that capability. What if it can’t? Then is there a clan, a tribe, a political party, or a militia that can meet the challenge? Some group, and some Iraqi leaders, needs to step up. Otherwise a tiny and ruthless minority will use raw intimidation to rule the whole. This has happened many times in history and could happen in Iraq, again.