A Marine Corps move to Afghanistan raises questions
Today’s New York Times ran a story about a “trial balloon” floated by the U.S. Marine Corps to withdraw completely from Iraq’s Al-Anbar province and instead take over the mission in Afghanistan, currently staffed by the U.S. Army.
Commentary
The most likely reason driving this proposal is the success the Marine Corps has achieved in Anbar province. With the province largely pacified and cooperation with the local Sunni-Arab population strong, Anbar becomes a candidate for sharp reductions in U.S. forces next year. That would leave the Marine Corps out of work. But with the U.S. Army still under strain, the Marine Corps would still have to make a contribution somewhere. Afghanistan is a two-brigade mission, the same size as the current Marine Corps commitment to Anbar. It seems like a logical swap of duties.
And with the Army under stress, it may like the idea of being able to focus, for now at least, its pre-deployment preparation on one type of mission, urban counterinsurgency in an Arab country. The Marines would refocus on Afghanistan’s rural/mountain/cold weather environment. Thus, there may be efficiency gains in this arrangement.
However, questions arise.
1. The NATO/U.S. procedure regarding tactics in the Afghan theater is to perform ground operations “by, with, and through” Afghan security forces. This means that the first task of the Marines would be to train, mentor, and operate with existing Afghan forces, while also being able to support their ongoing expansion. Does the U.S. Marine Corps have the same or greater capacity to do this than the existing U.S. Army operation in Afghanistan? If not, would there not then be backsliding on this most important task? What would justify this risk?
2. Would the Marine Corps’s practice of seven-month deployments be suitable for the task of training and supporting the Afghan security forces?
3. The current high operational tempo is straining the Marines as much as it is straining the Army. Moving the two-regiment Marine Corps mission from Anbar to Afghanistan would not reduce the strain on the Marines. And what if the Joint Staff recommended an increase in the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan? Then the U.S. Army would have to re-enter the Afghan theater, bringing an end to any efficiency gains.
4. How would an equally high operating tempo for the Marine Corps in Afghanistan help the Marines refocus on full-spectrum operations, such as the amphibious assault mission, high-intensity mechanized operations, and operations in a variety of climates and terrain?
It is good news that an apparent Marine Corps victory in Anbar province will soon allow the Marines there to come home. It is also good that the Marine Corps leadership wants to keep the Corps in the fight.
But it might be a better idea to use this opportunity to prepare the Marine Corps for other missions, and for the future.
The idea by the Marine Corps commandant would effectively leave the Iraq war in the hands of the Army while giving the Marines a prominent new role in Afghanistan, under overall NATO command.
[…]
At the moment, there are no major Marine units among the 26,000 or so American forces in Afghanistan. In Iraq there are about 25,000 marines among the 160,000 American troops there.
[…]
Whether the Marine proposal takes hold, the most delicate counterterrorism missions in Afghanistan, including the hunt for forces of Al Qaeda and the Taliban,
would remain the job of a military task force that draws on Army, Navy and Air Force Special Operations units.
Commentary
The most likely reason driving this proposal is the success the Marine Corps has achieved in Anbar province. With the province largely pacified and cooperation with the local Sunni-Arab population strong, Anbar becomes a candidate for sharp reductions in U.S. forces next year. That would leave the Marine Corps out of work. But with the U.S. Army still under strain, the Marine Corps would still have to make a contribution somewhere. Afghanistan is a two-brigade mission, the same size as the current Marine Corps commitment to Anbar. It seems like a logical swap of duties.
And with the Army under stress, it may like the idea of being able to focus, for now at least, its pre-deployment preparation on one type of mission, urban counterinsurgency in an Arab country. The Marines would refocus on Afghanistan’s rural/mountain/cold weather environment. Thus, there may be efficiency gains in this arrangement.
However, questions arise.
1. The NATO/U.S. procedure regarding tactics in the Afghan theater is to perform ground operations “by, with, and through” Afghan security forces. This means that the first task of the Marines would be to train, mentor, and operate with existing Afghan forces, while also being able to support their ongoing expansion. Does the U.S. Marine Corps have the same or greater capacity to do this than the existing U.S. Army operation in Afghanistan? If not, would there not then be backsliding on this most important task? What would justify this risk?
2. Would the Marine Corps’s practice of seven-month deployments be suitable for the task of training and supporting the Afghan security forces?
3. The current high operational tempo is straining the Marines as much as it is straining the Army. Moving the two-regiment Marine Corps mission from Anbar to Afghanistan would not reduce the strain on the Marines. And what if the Joint Staff recommended an increase in the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan? Then the U.S. Army would have to re-enter the Afghan theater, bringing an end to any efficiency gains.
4. How would an equally high operating tempo for the Marine Corps in Afghanistan help the Marines refocus on full-spectrum operations, such as the amphibious assault mission, high-intensity mechanized operations, and operations in a variety of climates and terrain?
It is good news that an apparent Marine Corps victory in Anbar province will soon allow the Marines there to come home. It is also good that the Marine Corps leadership wants to keep the Corps in the fight.
But it might be a better idea to use this opportunity to prepare the Marine Corps for other missions, and for the future.
posted by Westhawk at 12:54 PM
2 Comments:
I think the victory declaration in al Anbar Province is premature. Further, whatever comes down in al Anbar comes out of the November 2004 destruction of Fallujah. This was nearly a 2 division strenght Marine and Army joint operation. Extreme violence and conventional warfare is as important in al Anbar as COIN. The Sheik al Anbar Awakening didn't occurr with US direction. Consequently, I see the Marine withdrawl as an acnowledgment that there is no longer an ongoing combat mission and that the Marines would like to get out while the getting out is good while declaring victory.
"victory" in Anbar smells of this whole pattern of trying to read into tea leaves of minor changes in the day to day situation that do not really influence the center of gravity. It buys into the whole crap.
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