America’s long-term relationship with Iraq

The U.S. and Iraqi governments have begun a negotiation on the structure of their long-term bilateral relationship. The very fact that this negotiation has begun indicates that the two governments must believe that the worst of the civil violence is now in the past. The two sides will terminate the United Nations authority for the multi-national force at the end of 2008. After that, the U.S. and Iraq will enter into a security assistance agreement, similar to scores of other such bilateral agreements the U.S. has with countries around the world.

What would the two sides want from such an agreement? At first blush, one might think that the Iraqi government, dominated as it is by embittered Shi’ites, would simply want the Americans gone. This apparently continues to be the view of al-Sadr and the Mahdis. With the Americans gone, Iraq’s Shi’ites could complete their revenge against their former Sunni oppressors. And enjoying a cozy relationship with Iran, today’s Shi’ite leaders in Iraq might feel confident about being protected by the region’s 800 pound gorilla.

But if Iraq’s Shi'ite leaders are entering into negotiations with the U.S. on a long-term strategic relationship, it becomes clear that they don’t have much confidence in Iran being their protector in the long-run. In addition, Iraq’s Shi’ite leaders must fear a backlash from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Gulf states, and other Sunni powers should they elect to pursue a hostile course with Iraq’s Sunnis. They must conclude, as so many other leaders around the world have, that the Americans can be their best protectors. Iraq’s Kurds and Sunnis will certainly want continuing American protection, to help reinforce a balance of power among Iraq’s three sects. Thus, an Iraqi invitation for an ongoing security relationship will likely be an uncontroversial, and to many, a surprising, outcome.

What would the U.S. get from such an arrangement? After a bitter and surprisingly costly stabilization of Iraq, one would expect the next U.S. president to look for any opportunity to cut America’s cost and commitment there as expeditiously as possible. The U.S. certainly wants the Iraqis to take responsibility for Iraq’s internal security as quickly as is feasible. As for Iraq’s external security, Iraq will soon have a relatively large, well-trained, and experienced army, more than a match for any likely regional challengers. Thus, there seems to be little reason for a significant ongoing American presence in Iraq, once Iraqi security forces can enforce internal security and once a balance of power among the three sects is established.

However, policymakers always prefer to have as many options and as much flexibility as possible. By adding Iraq to the list of basing options available to the U.S. military, the U.S. reduces its vulnerability to pressure from other countries in the region that currently host American bases. For example, the airbases at Incirlik and Masirah are very important to U.S. military operations throughout the Middle East and Central Asia. But the importance of those bases gives Turkey and Oman distinct leverage over the U.S. The same can be said about U.S. facilities in Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Diego Garcia. The more options the U.S. affords itself, the greater diplomatic and strategic flexibility it will enjoy, and the less vulnerable it would be to diplomatic coercion.

Critics will denounce the imperialistic tinge of permanent U.S. bases in Iraq. Such symbolism could in theory create a popular backlash against the U.S.

But “permanent bases” is something of an obsolete concept. Catching up with the long-established practice of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, the Army and Air Force are now more interested in expeditionary methods. It is neither necessary nor desirable to have large Cold War-style overseas garrisons. The Army and Air Force maintain at foreign host locations pre-positioned equipment and supplies both for training and for wartime contingencies. Contractors or a tiny uniformed American staff can maintain these depots. Army brigade combat teams and Air Force expeditionary wings can fly in for training or for contingencies. Large permanent garrisons at “permanent” overseas bases are no longer needed. The U.S and Iraqi governments can certainly create such an arrangment in Iraq.

What will be surprising to domestic audiences in both Iraq and the U.S. is how uncontroversial the long-term bilateral security agreement will turn out to be.