Who’s in charge of unconventional warfare?
Is the U.S. unconventional warfare effort getting the attention, leadership, and resources it deserves? In its broadest definition, unconventional warfare is warfare that is conducted by assisting, advising, training, and equipping friendly indigenous forces. By using unconventional warfare, the U.S. attempts to achieve its national security objectives working “by, with, and through” the native population, rather than using its own general purpose forces.
Should the U.S. Department of Defense create a new command that would focus on global unconventional warfare doctrine, training, and missions? Does the U.S. Special Operations Command currently focus too much on direct action missions and neglect working with indigenous forces abroad, just when such efforts have never been more important?
If the Pentagon were to stand up a new unconventional warfare command, who would be in it? Would the embryonic Combat Advisor Corps at Fort Riley, composed of personnel who for the most part are not graduates of the Army’s Special Forces Qualification Course, be included? Should the U.S. Marine Corps participate? Should an unconventional warfare headquarters come under the U.S. Special Operations Command? Or should it be a new unified command, separate from SOCOM?
At the latest issue of Armed Forces Journal, Mr. Sean Naylor reports on the latest debates swirling around this issue. Mr. Michael Vickers, the new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict, is now considering this issue. I recommend reading Mr. Naylor’s article.
Should the U.S. Department of Defense create a new command that would focus on global unconventional warfare doctrine, training, and missions? Does the U.S. Special Operations Command currently focus too much on direct action missions and neglect working with indigenous forces abroad, just when such efforts have never been more important?
If the Pentagon were to stand up a new unconventional warfare command, who would be in it? Would the embryonic Combat Advisor Corps at Fort Riley, composed of personnel who for the most part are not graduates of the Army’s Special Forces Qualification Course, be included? Should the U.S. Marine Corps participate? Should an unconventional warfare headquarters come under the U.S. Special Operations Command? Or should it be a new unified command, separate from SOCOM?
At the latest issue of Armed Forces Journal, Mr. Sean Naylor reports on the latest debates swirling around this issue. Mr. Michael Vickers, the new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict, is now considering this issue. I recommend reading Mr. Naylor’s article.
posted by Westhawk at 3:25 PM
2 Comments:
Winds of Change in the Military Approach
Douglas Farah
In recent weeks I have spent time at numerous events with U.S. military personnel across the different services, speaking, listening and watching as the senior officers challenge the assumptions they have help on the war on terrorism, Iraq, Afghanistan and other pressing issues.
One of the most innovative new concepts bubbling to the surface is that a great deal can be accomplished in pushing back against Islamist radicals, transnational criminal groups, warlords and militias by recognizing these issues all affect a nation’s sovereignty.
If one recognizes this, then the need to form coalitions built on U.S. assumptions, pressures and cajoling diminishes considerably. Nations can take actions in their own enlightened self interest to improve or regain their own sovereignty that benefit aspects of U.S. policy, without having to agree on any other policy aspect.
Most nations do not want organized criminal networks corrupting the system. Most do not want their territory to be terrorist enclaves. Most do not want warlords controlling vast swaths of territory.
This concept of helping nations focus on their own national sovereignty issues is liberating from the highly unpopular concepts of “coalitions of the willing” and other policies that have been trotted out in recent times.
One of the realities that much of the military has recognized for many years is that this will not be a military war, at least not the vast bulk of the struggles that arise. The military remains an integral and vital part of the architecture to deal with state and non-state threats, but are not the only part and are often not the lead part.
Given the weakness of the State Department, the generally-recognized inability of Karen Hughes to advance a coherent agenda on outreach, the weakness of the intelligence community and the hodge-podge on strategic thinking that has often prevailed, the military has been called on to do things that it is not qualified to do and should not be asked to do.
I don’t know how Iraq will turn out or if the situation in Pakistan will lead to a strengthening of al Qaeda. I do know that much creative thinking is now going into the short and long term issues this complex mosaic presents. It is refreshing to see.
Part of the problem is not just the conflict with direct action, but the conflict with use of GBs for training host nation militaries. I think what we want is more Lawrence of Arabia type guys. Like what we did in Afghanistan. This implies ability to fund guerillas. To funnel arms. To do it to some unsavory characters and to do it secretly. There is a heavy CIA type skill here. It is not like the guys in Columbia who train the army there, and aren't even allowed to go on missions (and so look like wimps).
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