More problems for the nation-state

During his tour this week of the front lines of the Long War, in the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan, U.S. Defense Secretary Gates has no doubted asked for some creative thinking from his subordinates about how to make progress on the intractable problems found there. It seems as if his military officers on the front lines have an answer for him, an answer not at all pleasing to career diplomats at the State Department, or anyone else favoring the Westphalian nation-state tradition. Two articles from the today’s Washington Post explain. First:

U.S. military officials say Somalia is the greatest source of instability in the Horn of Africa, leading them to seek new ways to contain the violence there.

One approach, Pentagon officials argue, would be to forge ties with Somaliland, as the U.S. military has with Kenya and other countries bordering Somalia. A breakaway region along Somalia's northwestern coast, Somaliland has about 2 million people and an elected president, and offers greater potential for U.S. military assistance to bolster security, even though it lacks international recognition, they say.

"Somaliland is an entity that works," a senior defense official said. "We're caught between a rock and a hard place because they're not a recognized state," the official said.

The Pentagon's view is that "Somaliland should be independent," another defense
official said. "We should build up the parts that are functional and box in" Somalia's unstable regions, particularly around Mogadishu.

In contrast, "the State Department wants to fix the broken part first -- that's been a failed policy," the official said.

The official U.S. government position is that the United States should withhold recognition from Somaliland because the African Union has yet to recognize it. "We do not want to get ahead of the continental organization on an issue of such importance," said Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi E. Frazer in an e-mailed response to questions.

The issue is diplomatically sensitive because recognizing Somaliland could set a precedent for other secession movements seeking to change colonial-era borders, opening a Pandora's box in the region. In Djibouti, U.S. military officials say they are eager to engage Somaliland. "We'd love to, we're just waiting for State to give us the okay," said Navy Capt. Bob Wright, head of strategic communication for the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa.

The U.S. government’s military men in the field have a competent and functional entity, Somaliland, with which they can work to manage the problem Somalia’s anarchy is causing to the greater Horn of Africa region. But this is apparently a non-starter for the State Department because it doesn’t fit in with the Westphalian primacy of the nation-state. Of course, in Somalia’s case, adherents of the State Department’s principles must ignore the fact that the internationally recognized “government” in Mogadishu is currently little more than a chaotic mob.

Then it was off to Afghanistan, where again U.S. military officers had the same sort of advice for Secretary Gates:

Senior defense officials said that under one initiative being considered, local tribesmen would be trained and armed to fight Taliban insurgents in southern Afghanistan, the stronghold of the radical Islamic militia.

[…]

The tribal initiative would begin with a British pilot project in Helmand province and would be broadly similar to a U.S. military drive in Iraq that has recruited thousands of local fighters -- including tribesmen and former insurgents -- to police their neighborhoods, the officials said.

In Afghanistan, as in Iraq, the plan reflects a concern among senior U.S. officials that coalition forces have relied too much on the central government to build security forces, an approach they say runs counter to both tribal culture and the need for community policing.

The U.S. military in Iraq only began to achieve success after it gave up trying to accomplish its goals through a strong central government in Baghdad. Once U.S. commanders began focusing their efforts on developing relations with tribal and local leaders and on community-based security programs, the situation improved dramatically. As for Afghanistan, the government in Kabul will be able to afford its planned 70,000 man army only with constant foreign aid from the West. Such a force is obviously too small to secure the interior and borders of the country. Afghanistan can only become secure through local, tribal self-help.

These realities about modern conflict represent the end of a grand era for traditional foreign ministers, ambassadors, and diplomats. From the rise of Napoleon to the end of the Cold War, a two century span, the nation-state, its ministers and its diplomats reigned supreme. Today’s adversaries have bypassed the nation-state and weakened it as a result. Nation-states such as the United States are now finding that the most effective way to respond is to operate on the same tribal playing field. The necessity of adaptation has left the Westphalian nation-state system behind.