Basra is a test of America's exit strategy
President Bush has called the current battle between Iraqi security forces and Sadr militiamen in Basra “a defining moment.” In his mind, President Bush probably likens the Basra battle to America’s Whiskey Rebellion, when President Washington had to defend the new constitution against a militia uprising. Of course, many other observers interpret the violence in Basra as Shi’ite factions, some in government uniforms, battling for economic spoils in Basra and the surrounding oil patch.
For the U.S. military in Iraq, the battle for Basra is a defining moment for its exit strategy from the country. Namely, will,
Indigenous soldiers + U.S. advisors + U.S. ISR, logistics, and air support = battlefield dominance?
The current battle in Basra is the purest test of this model; to my knowledge there are no U.S. general purpose ground combat units yet engaged in this action. If the Iraqi conventional ground forces, with U.S. indirect support, can prevail against the stubborn Sadr militia in Basra, the U.S. military command will see a quicker way out for U.S. general purpose units in the country.
More importantly, success of this advisor-support model will encourage various factions in Iraq to ally themselves with the U.S. – they won’t want to be on the wrong side of this model when it is used in the future. Demonstrating a technique that works will indicate that there is at least one useful tool in the toolbox. When everyone witnesses that, the incentive for being a troublemaker will drop.
For the U.S. military in Iraq, the battle for Basra is a defining moment for its exit strategy from the country. Namely, will,
Indigenous soldiers + U.S. advisors + U.S. ISR, logistics, and air support = battlefield dominance?
The current battle in Basra is the purest test of this model; to my knowledge there are no U.S. general purpose ground combat units yet engaged in this action. If the Iraqi conventional ground forces, with U.S. indirect support, can prevail against the stubborn Sadr militia in Basra, the U.S. military command will see a quicker way out for U.S. general purpose units in the country.
More importantly, success of this advisor-support model will encourage various factions in Iraq to ally themselves with the U.S. – they won’t want to be on the wrong side of this model when it is used in the future. Demonstrating a technique that works will indicate that there is at least one useful tool in the toolbox. When everyone witnesses that, the incentive for being a troublemaker will drop.

4 Comments:
I linked your post Linked to the Elephant Bar, Folly of deBaathification and Basra. I am feeling a Tet moment.
The Thunder Run has linked to this post in the - Web Reconnaissance for 03/30/2008 A short recon of what’s out there that might draw your attention updated throughout the day…so check back often.
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Ceasefires In Iraq Go Through Iran's Quds Force
It should not go unnoticed that Iranian Quds Force commander Brigadier General Qassem Suleimani issued the cease-fire to the Mahdi Army. The backdrop to Sadr’s dramatic statement was a secret trip Friday by Iraqi lawmakers to Qom, Iran’s holy city...
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Vali Nasr, the author of The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future, said in an interview that “Al-Sadr achieved what he wanted. He stood his ground, made his point and showed he has the real power in the south, not his rivals.” Muqtada al-Sadr’s Shi’a rivals in the south are the Badr Brigades of ISCI and Fadhila, which controls the governorship of al-Basra province and holds sway over much of the critical oil operations there.
That said, we interpret that if anyone “got what he wanted” among the bad actors, it was General Suleimani and Iran, not Sadr, whose usefulness to the Iranians no longer extends much farther than his father’s name. At the same time, it cannot be discounted that the Mahdi Army uprising from Baghdad all the way to Basra was combated by the Iraqi Army and security forces with limited assistance from Coalition forces - and not the other way around.
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McClatchy: Iranian general played key role in Iraq cease-fire
The Weekly Standard: General Panic
ThreatsWatch.Org: PrincipalAnalysis: Dangerous Liaisons
ThreatsWatch.Org: PrincipalAnalysis: Qods Force, Karbala and the Language of War
The Long War Journal: Home
The Weekly Standard: Qods Force Pulls Sadr's Strings
Carnegie Council: The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future
AP: Al-Sadr Trumps in Latest Showdown
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