Does Iraq really prepare the Army for everything?

Small Wars Journal Blog has become host to a debate between U.S. Army officers over whether U.S. ground forces are becoming too focused on counterinsurgency operations, and are thus in danger of becoming unprepared for high-intensity combined arms operations. Colonel Peter Mansoor, USA, currently on General Petraeus’s staff in Iraq and formerly a brigade commander there, is not concerned about this issue:

[LTC Gian] Gentile worries that the U.S. Army has lost the capability to conduct conventional warfighting operations. I disagree. The Army has not lost that capability; today's Army is the most experienced, professional, and capable combined arms force in our nation's history. Since 2003 the U.S. Army and Marine Corps have routinely engaged in conventional warfighting. Battles in Karbala, An Najaf, Fallujah, Tal Afar, Mosul, Baqubah, Baghdad, and elsewhere have proven the capabilities of our ground forces to engage in conventional combat operations. Combat units routinely use armor, artillery, mechanized infantry, attack aviation, close air support, and other assets to accomplish their missions. The fact that our units are doing non-kinetic operations doesn't mean they've stopped doing high-intensity kinetic operations or have forgotten how.

Hmm. Colonel Mansoor would surely acknowledge that a very important factor determining the Army’s ability to effectively conduct high-intensity conventional operations is the nature of the enemy engaged. In Iraq, that enemy is almost always squad-sized dismounted light infantry with few crew-served weapons, no armored vehicles, no mobility, no supporting arms, no air power, and little or no communications capability when in contact. Although a challenge in the counterinsurgency dimension, such an opponent does not provide a very stressful test of a battle-staff’s ability to command a modern mechanized brigade against similarly matched foes in a high-intensity battle.

Won’t U.S. airpower scour the battlefield of enemy armored vehicles and artillery, as it did in February 1991 and March 2003? Perhaps, if the U.S. always gets a chance to start ground operations on its schedule. What if it doesn’t? What if surface-to-surface missile attacks shut down at critical moments the U.S. Air Force’s theater tactical bases? What if enemy submarine operations disrupt U.S. Navy aircraft carrier flight operations? Are the U.S. Army’s battalion and brigade staffs ready to face off against an enemy fighting on his schedule, enjoying air superiority, and the freedom to maneuver his mechanized forces? The kinetic operations the U.S. Army and Marines Corps are currently performing in Iraq do not prove that they are ready for this scenario.

That scenario may seem far-fetched. But as Frank Hoffman described in his paper on hybrid wars (see pages 35-42), even a non-state actor such as Hezbollah could provide some surprising capabilities. Hezbollah launched thousand of short and medium range rockets during its month-long conflict with Israel in the summer of 2006. Despite complete air supremacy, the Israeli Air Force was unable to suppress Hezbollah’s rocket capability – Hezbollah’s largest rocket barrage occurred on the final day of the conflict. Hezbollah proved very proficient employing anti-tank guided missiles and with these missiles and land mines, knocked out a battalion’s worth of Israeli armored vehicles. Hezbollah employed UAVs in the conflict. It also had a significant signal intelligence capability, intercepting Israeli cell phone traffic and perhaps some Israeli encrypted military radio communications.

It seems clear that Israeli commanders and their staffs were not prepared for the intensity and sophistication of the Hezbollah defense. With all respect, Colonel Mansoor and his supporters will have to provide a better argument why U.S. kinetic operations in Iraq are adequate preparation for the full range of high-intensity scenarios and opponents.

Having made this assertion, let me be clear that I am not a member of that club that believes that the Army’s (and Marine Corps’s) general purpose forces are infinitely adaptable for any problem, including counterinsurgency. The case for LTC Nagl’s permanent advisory corps is clear; the Congress should fund and stand up this command forthwith. Permanent and worldwide “Phase Zero” operations should become a major priority of the Army and Marine Corps. The culture, recruiting, training, and personnel management of U.S. ground forces needs to adapt to this approach. Such an adaptation will be difficult and painful.

However, the Army should not neglect preparation for high-intensity conventional operations, nor delude itself into believing that its ongoing experience in Iraq and Afghanistan is all of the preparation it needs.

The answer might be unit specialization, a concept anathema to many officers. This is subject for further debate. For now, the task is to stand up the permanent Advisor Command, while also confessing the shortfall in preparation for high-intensity operations. How to actually fix these problems while the Iraq and Afghan wars go on remains the challenge.