Basra battle validates U.S. exit strategy

About three weeks ago, I asserted that the technique the Iraq government and its U.S. advisers were employing in Basra was a test of the U.S. command’s exit strategy from Iraq. The test results are now in. The U.S. has validated its strategy. The U.S. now has a clear path to achieve its goals in Iraq with a much smaller commitment of U.S. ground forces.

In that post from March 29th, I said:

For the U.S. military in Iraq, the battle for Basra is a defining moment for its exit strategy from the country. Namely, will,

Indigenous soldiers + U.S. advisors + U.S. ISR, logistics, and air support = battlefield dominance?

The current battle in Basra is the purest test of this model; to my knowledge there are no U.S. general purpose ground combat units yet engaged in this action. If the Iraqi conventional ground forces, with U.S. indirect support, can prevail against the stubborn Sadr militia in Basra, the U.S. military command will see a quicker way out for U.S. general purpose units in the country.

Has this model now worked? The New York Times reports that it has:

Iraqi soldiers took control of the last bastions of the cleric Moktada al-Sadr’s militia in Basra on Saturday, and Iran’s ambassador to Baghdad strongly endorsed the Iraqi government’s month-long military operation against the fighters.

By Saturday evening, Basra was calm, but only after air and artillery strikes by American and British forces cleared the way for Iraqi troops to move into the Hayaniya district and other remaining Mahdi Army militia strongholds and begin house-to house searches, Iraqi officials said. Iraqi troops were meeting little resistance, said Maj. Gen. Abdul-Karim Khalaf, the spokesman for the Iraqi Interior Ministry in Baghdad.

Although the Basra operation appeared to begin badly for the Iraqi government, the Iraqi government, no doubt with substantial help from its U.S. and British advisers, quickly corrected its shortcomings. It fired disloyal soldiers, replaced ineffective commanders, and improved its coordination with the Americans and British. In other words, it took the steps any serious organization needs to take in order to improve its performance. The U.S. should be pleased it has an ally that it now exhibiting these organizational characteristics.

Sadr and the Mahdi Army are not dead. They very likely remain an organized force, now deeper in the shadows. The main point of the Basra battle was to cut off Sadr’s cadres from organized criminal control of the city and its commerce. It remains to be seen whether the Iraqi government has achieved that objective. And in Baghdad, the battle for Sadr City continues, with American ground forces still playing a major role.

But the Basra episode was a major turning point for the American war aims in Iraq. Basra showed that indigenous ground combat formations, with American and British indirect support, can prevail against a stubborn opponent. Even better, the battle showed that the Iraqi government and its security forces could adapt, improve, and demonstrate persistence. The U.S. now has a way to prevail in Iraq while it simultaneously extracts its ground combat forces from the country.

POSTSCRIPT

The New York Times also published an analysis piece that discussed why Iranian and U.S. interests appeared to converge over the Basra issue. According to the New York Times writers, the Iranian government now supports the Iraqi government’s assault on Sadr’s forces in Basra because the Iranians want to see Hakim’s faction prevail in southern Iraq. The New York Times theorizes that since Hakim wants a semiautonomous Shi’ite homeland in the south (something that Sadr opposes), the Iranians are more likely to achieve political control in the Shi’ite portion of Iraq under Hakim rather than Sadr.

I question the logic of this view. Any Iraqi Shi’ite leader who gets too cozy with the Iranians, especially one who might be leading a future Iraqi Shi’ite homeland, will soon make enemies of the entire Sunni-Arab nation, the Kurds, and the Americans. By cooperating with the Americans and befriending top American leaders, the Hakims will not be forced into an alliance with Iran – and as just explained it would be foolish for them to do so.

Sadr, on the other hand, has no other choice. The American will never be his friend, he has burned his bridges with the other Iraqi Shi’ite leaders, and now the Sunni-Arabs are applauding Maliki for taking on Sadr. Had Sadr prevailed, he would certainly have become an Iranian ally – he had no other choices. Hakim could become an Iranian ally, but only if he is foolish, which does not appear to be the case. Thus, the Americans are better off with Hakim winning this battle over Sadr.

So why are the Iranians now rejecting Sadr? Sadr has lost, at least in the south. What benefit would the Iranians accrue at this point by backing a loser?