Secretary Gates gets a case of sloppy thinking

In a speech he delivered yesterday in Colorado Springs, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates criticized the defense establishment for having a case of “Next-War-itis.” Mr. Gates demanded that the defense establishment focus on finishing the current conflicts. Not content to stop there, he then asserted that the defense establishment would do best to prepare for more such Iraq and Afghanistan-style conflicts, instead of conventional high-intensity wars. Finally, Secretary Gates expressed his confidence that for the foreseeable future, America’s air and naval power could easily “defeat” “any” adversary who might commit an act of aggression, even as he admitted that U.S. land power is currently unprepared for another major contingency.

Over the last year I have had a lot of praise for Secretary Gates. But this speech was a bad slip-up on his part. More than anything else, it indicated that he perhaps doesn’t really understand the purpose of the office he holds. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is certainly responsible for current military operations. But its gravest responsibility is to prepare the Department for the problems it will face twenty years or more into the future. Everything OSD does – research, engineering, procurement, institutional culture, war plans, diplomacy, legislative relationships, and more – come with very long lead times attached. Wrong decisions will hang around for years and will take even longer to fix. If OSD is not thinking about the future, the country will surely suffer from some nasty surprises.

So what exactly did Mr. Gates get so wrong yesterday? I will comment on quotes from his speech:

1) The record of the past quarter century is clear: the Soviets in Afghanistan, the Israelis in Lebanon, the United States in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Smaller, irregular forces – insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists – will find ways, as they always have, to frustrate and neutralize the advantages of larger, regular militaries. And even nation-states will try to exploit our perceived vulnerabilities in an asymmetric way, rather than play to our inherent strengths.

Overall, the kinds of capabilities we will most likely need in the years ahead will often resemble the kinds of capabilities we need today.

First, the Pentagon’s top priority should be to prepare for threats that can do the most harm to the U.S. and its interests. Think of the concept of expected value, which equals probability multiplied by consequence. Small, irregular wars in the world’s ungoverned spaces may be the most frequent events, but they will usually have small consequences for U.S. interests. Nuclear missile attack or Chinese military hegemony in Asia may have low probabilities (at the moment) but the consequences are sky high.

Second, this quote from Mr. Gates’s speech is illogical and self-contradictory. The examples he lists to show the kinds of irregular wars we are most likely to face are themselves the best examples of how not to handle these situations. Does Mr. Gates really believe the U.S. political system is going to approve more such large-scale deployments of U.S. general purpose ground formations into future hypothetical COIN campaigns? Yes, there will be all variety of small wars in the years ahead. But the U.S. can’t and won’t fight them the way we have in Iraq and Afghanistan. What is Secretary Gates’s vision for how his Department should prepare for these cases? In this speech, he didn’t say, except to imply more of the same.

2) First, I believe that any major weapons program, in order to remain viable, will have to show some utility and relevance to the kind of irregular campaigns that, as I mentioned, are most likely to engage America’s military in the coming decades … Second, I would stress that the perennial procurement cycle – going back many decades – of adding layer upon layer of cost and complexity onto fewer and fewer platforms that take longer and longer to build must come to an end.

Without a fundamental change in this dynamic, it will be difficult to sustain support for these kinds of weapons programs in the future.

Another self-contradictory set of assertions. Mr. Gates criticizes “adding layer upon layer of cost and complexity” yet his previous sentence, wherein he demands that new programs have features that make them relevant for irregular warfare, is the very kind of Pentagon practice that adds “layer upon layer of cost and complexity.”

The Pentagon needs to purchase weapons that address the highest expected value (probability x consequence) threats. Everyone (except the contractors) would prefer cheap and simple to costly and complex. But what really matters is effectiveness. What if costly and complex is required for effectiveness? Maybe that’s just the way it is. Readers of this blog will know that I harbor doubts about the usefulness of the F-22. And I also think the JSF is likely to be obsolete, and replaceable with UAVs, the day it hits the ramp. But there are no blithe answers to procurement even if they come from the Secretary of Defense.

3) It is true that we would be hard-pressed to launch a major conventional ground operation elsewhere in the world at this time – but where would we sensibly do that? The United States has ample and untapped combat power in our naval and air forces, with the capacity to defeat any – repeat, any – adversary who committed an act of aggression – whether in the Persian Gulf, on the Korean Peninsula, or in the Straits of Taiwan. There is a risk – but a prudent and manageable one.

Earlier in his speech, Secretary Gates pointed out how Winston Churchill dismissed the chance of war against Germany in 1914, or war against Japan in 1941. But that didn’t prevent Mr. Gates from making similar bold predictions a few minutes later.

Once again, a SecDef’s first job is to prepare two decades into the future. What is Secretary Gates doing right now to compensate for expanding Chinese anti-access measures around Taiwan? When he says the U.S. can “defeat” “any – repeat, any” adversary in the Persian Gulf, how exactly would he define “defeat” with respect to the Iranian regime and its strategic intentions?

Any why is he so confident that air and naval power alone can defeat any adversary? If that is true, then why are U.S. ground forces bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan? If they are necessary there, might they also be necessary in the case of aggression somewhere else? With respect to high-intensity operations, does Secretary Gates understand the powerful synergy between ground maneuver and air power?

4) • The ground forces are growing by more than 90,000 over the next five years – with a bigger rotational pool of troops and units individual soldiers and Marines will deploy less frequently; and

• U.S. force levels in Iraq will decline over time – the debate taking place is mostly over the pacing.

Another set of contradictory sentences. If the U.S. is pulling its forces out of Iraq, then why is the DoD adding 90,000 ground troops to the force structure? Because Mr. Gates anticipates future large-scale COIN operations using general purpose formations? Does he really believe that? If not, why is he adding to the headcount, a decision just as costly and wasteful as purchasing unnecessary F-22s and F-35s?

Earlier in his speech, Mr. Gates mentioned his advice to West Point cadets, where he suggested that their most important assignments would entail advising and mentoring soldiers of other nations. If Mr. Gates really believes this, what has he done to institutionalize the Army’s permanent advisory capacity? Why do the Secretary’s actual decisions, in contrast to his speeches, seem to be on the wrong side of the “quality versus quantity” debate?

Mr. Gates recognizes the need for cultural reform inside the Pentagon. He has strived mightily to change the big ship’s course and as his time runs down, his frustration is showing.

But his speech in Colorado Springs indicated a shallow understanding of some of the issues central to his office. Mr. Gates undoubtedly means well. One wonders if anyone can succeed in that job.