U.S. experiment in Somalia yields more results

If this story from the New York Times is true, the U.S. military has killed a top al Qaeda commander in Somalia, along with several of his lieutenants. Aden Hashi Ayro was killed in the early morning hours while in hiding with his entourage at a compound in a town in central Somalia. At least four Tomahawk cruise missiles, fired from a U.S. warship in the Indian Ocean, administered the coup de grace.

As soon as the American counterattack in Afghanistan began in October 2001, the U.S. government was concerned that al Qaeda personnel would displace from their sanctuary in Afghanistan. The Horn of Africa, Sudan, and Somalia were considered possible refuges. The U.S. created the Horn of Africa task force in order to address this possibility.

Because it is ungoverned, Somalia appeared to be an attractive new sanctuary for fleeing al Qaeda leaders. Mr. Ayro was a Somali, but received training in Pakistan and had field experience in the Afghan-Pakistan theater. Mr. Ayro would be valuable to al Qaeda back in his home country where he could establish a safe zone for al Qaeda’s use, as it once had in Afghanistan and it has for now in parts of tribal Pakistan.

The U.S. government needed a new approach to deal with Somalia. The long-term, high-manpower, and media-intensive stabilization and nation-building operations the U.S. has pursued in Afghanistan and Iraq were completely unrealistic for Somalia. If ever a situation called for the indirect approach, it was Somalia.

In December 2006, the U.S. implemented this strategy when it supported a proxy force, the Ethiopian army and its blitzkrieg, into Somalia. Since then, Somalia’s normal state of chaos has intensified; tribal and civil war, population displacements, homeless refugees, and widespread violence are all worse than ever.

U.S. policy is not helping Somalia’s humanitarian situation and for this reason, U.S. government policy has come under criticism (for example, see this article from the U.S. Naval Institute). But the policy of stirring up chaos does seem to be achieving America’s national security objectives. In Somalia’s chaotic environment, the U.S. seems to be developing effective intelligence, enough to occasionally bring its firepower to bear. This is making Somalia a highly unattractive destination for al Qaeda’s leadership.

On New Year’s Eve 2006, I discussed the American experimental strategy in Somalia:

Somalia will continue to be a violent, tribal, and chaotic place. There is nothing anyone can do to change that. What the U.S. government is able to influence is whether Somalia will become Al Qaeda’s new global sanctuary. For a minimal expenditure, no American casualties, and no visible American commitment, the U.S., working through an Ethiopian proxy, has removed that possibility for the foreseeable future. Neither Ayman al-Zawahiri nor any of his close associates are likely to be able to make much use of Somalia for their purposes. Somalia’s chaos is no friend of Al Qaeda’s.

It will take several years to evaluate how the Ethiopian/American experiment in Somalia turns out. For the purpose of protecting vital American interests, it seems like a more successful and sustainable technique than that which is being attempted in Iraq. When the results from the two experiments are in, future U.S. policy makers may find that they have stumbled on a successful formula.

It is vital that the world acknowledges that the U.S. has prevailed on its terms in Iraq and Afghanistan. But after those conflicts wind down, the U.S. will need a new approach to deal with similar situations in the future. It simply won’t be sustainable to repeat the high-manpower and media-intensive strategies employed in those two conflicts. The indirect, proxy-based approach in Somalia may be the preferred tool in the future. Last night’s Tomahawk strike was another positive outcome from this experiment.