Why shouldn’t the President negotiate? There are reasons not to

The latest little dust-up from the U.S. presidential campaign concerns whether it is wise or foolish to negotiate with a country’s enemies, especially those of the odious variety. Entire rooms at libraries groan under the weight of the volumes written on negotiating theory. And the last word has not been written. As global media attention intensifies and so-called “fourth generation warfare” adversaries search for more advantages, theories of statecraft and negotiation tactics will undergo new scrutiny.

In today’s media age, should a U.S. president or his personal emissaries personally negotiate with hostile powers, be they either of the state or non-state variety? The answer is no, unless the U.S. side arrives to the negotiation with overwhelming leverage, enough to settle the conflict on America’s terms.

Why the reluctance to talk? Doesn’t talking afford the opportunity to reveal simple misunderstandings, or to find middle ground compromises that could end conflicts? Shouldn’t the U.S., the greatest Great Power, possess the confidence to look any adversary in the eye and deliver America’s point of view? And then listen to the response?

The Democratic candidates in this year’s U.S. presidential contest have stated that negotiating is not a synonym for appeasement. They say that negotiations are an underutilized tool to achieve America’s foreign policy objectives. They say that the President or his emissaries can deliver a tough message to an adversary and by clearly communicating in this way, increase the chance of getting what the U.S. wants.

Unfortunately this brave view ignores the disadvantages the West suffers from in the modern media age. The higher the level of the U.S. government official negotiating, the greater the media attention. Who can forget the intensity of media coverage that attended the U.S.-Soviet summit meetings? With this attention comes intense pressure to produce results, in the form of agreements and treaties. Failure to find a settlement results in blame, recrimination, and second-guessing, all directed at the Western side. Unless the Western leader possesses great moral courage, the home-grown and international pressure to present negotiating concessions begins in short order. The adversary side, universally from an authoritarian society, suffers no such pressure to settle.

It is thus no wonder that statecraft practitioners in the West show reluctance to engage in high-level diplomacy with authoritarian adversaries. These adversaries will play the global media, play for time, and likely view any agreement reached as a strategic pause before the later resumption of their campaign plan.

Isn’t the U.S. already negotiating with the very same enemies that the Bush administration has said it would never talk to? Of course. The U.S. government can and does transmit and receive messages from the Iranian government through Swiss, Iraqi, and EU intermediaries, among others. Before it began talking directly to the North Koreans (much to Japan’s dismay), the U.S. government used the Chinese foreign ministry as an intermediary. U.S. officers in Anbar province began discussions with insurgent leaders, at first using intermediaries. Neither the U.S. nor any of its adversaries lack the ability to communicate with each other.

In today’s intense media age, negotiations are not just a tool for avoiding or resolving conflicts. They are even more so a tool for extending conflicts, fighting them on new terrain, and for outmaneuvering and demoralizing an opponent.

The question for the U.S. presidential candidates is not whether the U.S. should talk to its enemies. It already does so. The question for the candidates (all of them) is what they plan to do to get the U.S. side some significant leverage in order to make these talks useful. Having the U.S. president show up at a negotiation is a form of leverage, but only for the other side.