Al Qaeda’s excellent sanctuary

As we approach the seventh anniversary of the U.S. counterattack against al Qaeda, some Americans might find this recent statement by Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mullen a bit disturbing:

"I believe fundamentally if the United States is going to get hit, it's going to come out of the planning that the leadership in the FATA is generating, their planning and direction," said Mullen, referring to Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas. "I'm not saying it is guaranteed it's going to happen, or that it's imminent. But clearly we know the planning is taking place."

Admiral Mullen’s view of the al Qaeda sanctuary in Pakistan’s tribal area matches the official view of the U.S. intelligence community, as it described in a report it issued last summer.

So what does the U.S. government intend to do about this threat it perceives to the U.S. homeland? Nothing any time soon, apparently:

But Adm. Michael G. Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said action to forcibly disrupt the militants' planning effort is unlikely for now. Difficulties faced by the new government in Islamabad, including a deteriorating economy, are forcing American and Pakistani leaders to wait before moving against extremists.

Al Qaeda’s senior leaders have arranged for themselves an excellent sanctuary. Even they must be surprised at how good their security is after nearly seven years of war.

As I discussed in a post from May 30th, Pakistan is simultaneously an ally and opponent of the U.S. military campaign in the region. Indeed, just yesterday, a border clash between Afghan soldiers on one side and Taliban insurgents and Pakistani soldiers on the other escalated until the U.S. military ended the engagement by shelling and bombing the Taliban-Pakistani positions.

Yet at the same time, the large and growing NATO-U.S. force inside Afghanistan could not continue without sustainment over the main supply routes that run through Pakistani territory.

When, in November 2001, Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants scampered out of Tora Bora into Pakistan, were they thinking this many moves ahead?

Since 2001, the U.S. has tried various approaches to get at the top al Qaeda leadership in FATA, all without success. Large reward money has failed to deliver a defector with useful intelligence. The Pakistani intelligence service has failed to cooperate. The Pakistani army has not shown the ability or will to operate in this area.

The U.S. has been unable or unwilling to organize its own unconventional warfare operation in the tribal areas. This indirect, “divide and conquer” approach likely is the best remaining alternative available to the U.S.

Why has it taken so long for the U.S. government to get behind this approach? It is risky and has a low probability of success. There may be a shortage of suitable tribal allies for such a venture. Such an effort could endanger the supply routes that the conventional effort inside Afghanistan requires. And the U.S. might not be able to attempt such a campaign without effectively going to war against either the Pakistani intelligence service or the Pakistani government, who would be fighting on very familiar territory. One can see why the U.S. would prefer to try all other options first.

The U.S. has thus found itself in a frustrating stalemate. What the Pakistani government, such as it is, must ponder is whether a catastrophic attack on the U.S. homeland, sourced from FATA, would result in an open-ended war by the U.S. against Pakistan. What U.S. leaders need to ponder is what that event would mean for the big-footprint operation in Afghanistan.