SOFA will be too much for Iraq to lift
Last year, the U.S. and Iraqi governments began serious negotiations on two agreements, a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and a Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA). “Dr. iRack” at the blog Abu Muqawama is following these negotiations.
In many ways, the SOFA and SFA negotiations are the culminating event of the American expedition into Iraq. Or at least the U.S. government would like these agreements to be the culmination of the campaign. The U.S. government sees these agreements as routine. For Iraq, however, SOFA and SFA raise fundamental questions for Iraqi society. It is probably asking too much for Iraq to complete these negotiations this year.
The U.S. would like the SOFA and SFA to establish a long-term security relationship between the two countries. The U.S. would like the completion of these negotiations to establish Iraq as a genuine and recognized sovereign government. It would also like these two agreements to establish a long-term operating relationship between the two governments. The U.S. government would like to see the American effort in Iraq result in an enduring security relationship with Iraq. Throughout most of the 20th century, the U.S. maintained numerous such security arrangements around the world and never considered these arrangements to be infringements on the host nation’s sovereignty. The U.S. government would like such an arrangement with Iraq to follow what it considers to be this normal pattern.
From the Iraqi perspective, the SOFA and SFA are novel and disturbing. As such, they are causing Iraqi society to undergo some difficult soul-searching. Are these agreements a beneficial military alliance that an immature Iraqi state needs while living in a dangerous neighborhood? Or are they an extension of a humiliating foreign occupation?
The struggle in Iraq has been a largely internal conflict over power, resources, and self-preservation. The various factions inside Iraq will have a full range of views over whether a long-term American military presence in Iraq will be helpful or harmful to that faction’s interests with respect to these internal conflicts. These factional differences over SOFA and SFA will make coming to an agreement with the U.S. even more difficult.
The proposed SOFA and SFA will force Iraqis to make some fundamental judgments about the structure and nature of their society. This is a process that normally takes decades or even centuries to complete. In fact, it is a task that is never really completed.
It should not be a surprise if the Iraqi government does not complete a negotiation with the U.S. government over SOFA and SFA this year, at least in a form that the U.S. is used to with other governments. It is likely a task beyond which the Iraqi government is presently capable.
The United Nations mandate authorizing the Coalition force in Iraq is due to expire at the end of the year. We are likely to see this mandate extended for another year while the Iraqis come to grips with who they are and what they want.
In many ways, the SOFA and SFA negotiations are the culminating event of the American expedition into Iraq. Or at least the U.S. government would like these agreements to be the culmination of the campaign. The U.S. government sees these agreements as routine. For Iraq, however, SOFA and SFA raise fundamental questions for Iraqi society. It is probably asking too much for Iraq to complete these negotiations this year.
The U.S. would like the SOFA and SFA to establish a long-term security relationship between the two countries. The U.S. would like the completion of these negotiations to establish Iraq as a genuine and recognized sovereign government. It would also like these two agreements to establish a long-term operating relationship between the two governments. The U.S. government would like to see the American effort in Iraq result in an enduring security relationship with Iraq. Throughout most of the 20th century, the U.S. maintained numerous such security arrangements around the world and never considered these arrangements to be infringements on the host nation’s sovereignty. The U.S. government would like such an arrangement with Iraq to follow what it considers to be this normal pattern.
From the Iraqi perspective, the SOFA and SFA are novel and disturbing. As such, they are causing Iraqi society to undergo some difficult soul-searching. Are these agreements a beneficial military alliance that an immature Iraqi state needs while living in a dangerous neighborhood? Or are they an extension of a humiliating foreign occupation?
The struggle in Iraq has been a largely internal conflict over power, resources, and self-preservation. The various factions inside Iraq will have a full range of views over whether a long-term American military presence in Iraq will be helpful or harmful to that faction’s interests with respect to these internal conflicts. These factional differences over SOFA and SFA will make coming to an agreement with the U.S. even more difficult.
The proposed SOFA and SFA will force Iraqis to make some fundamental judgments about the structure and nature of their society. This is a process that normally takes decades or even centuries to complete. In fact, it is a task that is never really completed.
It should not be a surprise if the Iraqi government does not complete a negotiation with the U.S. government over SOFA and SFA this year, at least in a form that the U.S. is used to with other governments. It is likely a task beyond which the Iraqi government is presently capable.
The United Nations mandate authorizing the Coalition force in Iraq is due to expire at the end of the year. We are likely to see this mandate extended for another year while the Iraqis come to grips with who they are and what they want.
posted by Westhawk at 9:54 AM
0 Comments:
Post a Comment
Links to this post:
Create a Link
<< Home