Ukraine, the big prize

Over a twenty year horizon, Russia should be a diminishing problem for the West. Russia’s population is in a steep decline. Its current domination of Europe’s energy supply will fade, as Russia’s production declines in the years ahead and Europe takes various actions to diversify away from dependence on Russia. And given the inherent volatility of world energy prices, it is very likely that Russia will suffer another financial crisis as it did during previous collapses in energy prices.

However, until any of these landmines explode, Russia’s leadership, which is both experienced yet foolishly giddy, will be a problem.

Ukraine is very likely to be the next flash point between Russia and the West. For both Russia and the West, Ukraine is the big prize. If Russia can successfully intimidate Ukraine’s leadership, Russia will have broken up the West’s best way of containing Russia, and the West’s most direct way of putting an end to Russia’s current round of adventurism. By contrast, should Ukraine move firmly into the European Union and NATO, Russia would be contained during the period when demographic, economic, and financial forces will weaken it to a point of irrelevance. For Russia, Ukraine represents a chance to gain extra time. For the West, Ukraine is a chance to box up the Russian problem for good. It is for these reasons that the stakes, and the dangers, over Ukraine are immense.

It is thus no surprise that President Bush sent his toughest messenger, Vice President Cheney, to Ukraine. On Friday, Mr. Cheney declared that Ukrainians should be able to live "without the threat of tyranny, economic blackmail and military invasion or intimidation." He said the United States has a "deep and abiding interest" in Ukraine's security (see this article in the Washington Post).

These are words that certainly raise the blood pressure in Moscow. For Russia’s leaders, Ukraine’s status is a “red line” issue, going to the very heart of Russia’s security interests. Vice President Cheney and other leaders in the West understand this. They also perceive that Russia overplayed its hand in Georgia. It thus might be a temptation to lure Russia into a misguided incursion into Ukraine. Goading Russia into such a trap could create a political disaster for Moscow that could unify Europe and the rest of the world against it.

This is obviously a dangerous game, which the U.S. and Europe may be in no position to play at this time. And as much as many Ukrainians, especially those in its political leadership, might want to move toward the West, they may not want to be a pawn between Russia and the West, certainly not at this moment.

Playing for Ukraine is a “home game” for Russia and an “away game” for the U.S. and Europe. In spite of the inclinations of its leaders, the Ukrainian electorate itself is deeply divided over its strategic future. Being the “home team,” Russia is in a good position to exploit this division. Adding to the confusion is a crack-up among the leaders of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution (as described in this article from The Economist). With squabbling having broken out among Ukraine’s top politicians, no one in the West should expect clarity any time soon from Ukraine’s leadership. This obviously works to Russia’s advantage.

Ukraine is the big prize and thus a dangerous flash point between Russia and the West. For the West, a firm alliance with Ukraine would anchor the containment of Russia. But for Russia, such an alliance would be a step too far. For Russia, winning Ukraine is vital. For the West, winning Ukraine would largely end its problems with Russia. It is for these reasons that the battle over Ukraine is both so tempting and so dangerous.