Arms deal with Taiwan is good news, for now

On Friday, the U.S. government announced a large arms sale to Taiwan. This sale had first been proposed early in the decade, but had been delayed due to internal Taiwanese political wrangling, American problems with former president Chen Shui-bian, and, more lately, the Beijing Olympics. With these obstacles cleared away, the deal, amounting to more than $6 billion, will now go forward.

Included in the package is an assortment of weaponry for defending Taiwan against a hypothetical PLA attack:

Among the weapons proposed for sale were $3.1 billion in Patriot Advanced Capability-3 guided missile systems, a sophisticated array of missiles, radars and control systems designed to defend against missiles and aircraft.

Also included in the proposed deal were $2.5 billion worth of Apache attack helicopters and support systems.

About $250 million in equipment to upgrade Taiwan’s E-2T Hawkeye surveillance aircraft was included, and $200 million in Harpoon antiship missiles.

The proposal also included more than $300 million in spare parts for Taiwanese
aircraft, including F-5 and F-16 jet fighters.

Completing the package was a proposal for selling Taiwan $47 million in Javelin guided missiles and command systems.

These systems should improve Taiwan’s ability to detect air and missile launches from the mainland, to intercept and destroy incoming air and missile threats, and to repel a possible amphibious landing or raid.

Notably missing from the list of items approved by the U.S. government was Taiwan’s request for 60 Blackhawk transport helicopters, 60 F-16 C/Ds, and funding for a study for Taiwan to produce diesel-electric attack submarines.

Although the government in Beijing objected to this long-awaited deal, it is still a good idea for all involved, to include the leadership in Beijing.

First, enhancing Taiwan’s defense reduces the probability of a crisis over the Taiwan Strait. Decision-makers on the mainland who might at some point in the future contemplate a military solution will have to discard this idea if they realize they it has less chance of succeeding.

Second, this deal ties Taiwan more tightly to the U.S. Earlier in the decade, some in Taiwan objected to purchasing these weapons from the U.S. because they wanted Taiwan to build up its indigenous defense industry instead. Had Taiwan chosen this course, it could have formulated its policies, including on the issue of independence from China, with little regard for American interests. This would have increased risk in the Taiwan Strait and made the U.S. vulnerable to poor decisions taken by leaders beyond its influence. Happily for the U.S., Taiwan has elected to buy its security through the U.S. and thus will have to take U.S. interests into account.

Third, by choosing to spend a considerable sum on its defense, President Ma Ying-jeou has shown that he will maintain a long-term commitment to Taiwan’s de facto independence. President Ma came to power with a promise of sharply improving relations with the mainland. One possible version of such a policy could have been a negotiated merger or reintegration with the mainland, as happened with Hong Kong and Macao in 1997. At some point, the people of Taiwan may no longer see any point in resisting reintegration with the mainland. Should they do so, Japan and the U.S. will have to brace for a sharp setback in their military position in the western Pacific. Once the PLA air force and navy fortify Taiwan as a base, China will have greatly expanded its military leverage over the U.S. and Japan. Thankfully, Taiwan is not ready for reintegration, as President Ma’s request for this arms package illustrates.

Finally, although the government in Beijing has issued its obligatory complaints, it should be happy for enhanced stability in the Taiwan Strait. The Beijing leadership is executing a long-term plan to gradually reabsorb Taiwan through greater commercial and investment ties, family and cultural connections, and the logic of overwhelming economic interest. This patient strategy is working for Beijing and it doesn’t need any hotheaded PLA officers or other nationalists to upset its inevitable success. When Taiwan increases its defensive strength, it assists Beijing’s strategy for an eventual peaceful merger.

U.S. policy-makers should be happy that the risk of miscalculation in the Taiwan Strait will now go down. However, U.S. and Japanese military planners need to figure out how they will manage with large PLA naval and air bases on Taiwan, a seemingly inevitable outcome a decade or two from now.