Scrambling for an answer in Afghanistan

WITH UPDATE BELOW

The Bush administration has launched an urgent staff effort to figure out why Afghanistan seems to be falling apart and to devise a new strategy that might arrest the slide. The Washington Post reported on the wide-ranging, yet short-fused effort:

Underlying the deliberations is a nearly completed National Intelligence Estimate on Afghanistan and the Pakistan-based extremists fighting there. Analysts have concluded that reconstituted elements of al-Qaeda and the resurgent Taliban are collaborating with an expanding network of militant groups, making the counterinsurgency war infinitely more complicated.

As the U.S. presidential election approaches, senior officials have expressed worry that the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan is so tenuous that it may fall apart while a new set of U.S. policymakers settles in.

Apparently, the deterioration in Afghanistan has become so dismaying that some U.S. policymakers have decided to approach the situation from first principles, and without any assumptions:

Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute, President Bush's senior adviser for Iraq and Afghanistan, has told Pentagon, intelligence and State Department officials to return to the basic questions: What are our objectives in Afghanistan? What can we hope to achieve? What are our resources? What is our allies' role? What do we know about the enemy? How likely is it that weak Afghan and Pakistani governments will rise to the occasion?

Commentary

General Lute asks some excellent questions. These lead to even more questions, which when summed together, may lead to some uncomfortable conclusions.

For instance, why are the Taliban and other insurgent forces apparently gaining strength? Is the Taliban more effective at recruiting gunmen now than it was five years ago? If so, why?

Does the Taliban have more popular support inside Afghanistan’s villages and towns? If so, why? Is this the result of effective Taliban intimidation, because the Taliban brings a popular message, or because it provides some other asset such as money or security?

A common response to such questions is to point to the perceived failure of the Karzai government in Kabul. Many observers accuse the central government of corruption, ineffectiveness, and a lack of popular support. In 2009, Afghanistan will hold elections for the presidency and for the lower house of parliament. U.S. policymakers must ask themselves whether the hypothetical election of a legitimate opposition figure such as Mr. Yunus Qanuni would make a material difference to those Afghans in the distant provinces who might be currently supporting the Taliban.

If the conclusion is that Afghanistan would function better under a much more decentralized form of governance, how would such a model affect U.S. strategy in the theater? Would it liberate U.S. forces to work with tribes on both sides of the border, accelerating the effort to attack al Qaeda leadership targets? Or would such an approach merely encourage political fragmentation and chaos in the region?

Then there is the question of the Afghan army. Observers agree that its expansion and proficiency has been a success story. If ISAF elects to support a decentralized governance model in Afghanistan, what would this mean for the future of the Afghan army?

Admiral Mullen explained today that the policy review underway aims to accomplish at least two things. First, it wants to view the problem as a regional one, not just a problem in Afghanistan. Second, the U.S. government hopes to improve the coordination of all the agencies that are working in Afghanistan.

These are both notable aims. But what remain unknown are the larger goals and overall strategy these aims will serve. General Lute has asked the questions. It will take some moral courage to face the answers.

UPDATE

This morning, the Los Angeles Times reports that a new U.S. strategy for Afghanistan will include a greater emphasis training local militias, and less support for the central government in Kabul. Perhaps U.S. strategists have learned something from their experience in Anbar Province.