Max Boot’s strategic dilemma has more than two horns
In my post from yesterday, I referenced Max Boot’s essay in the Wall Street Journal to discuss Israel’s options regarding Gaza. Mr. Boot made the point that Israel is caught in a difficult strategic dilemma. Israel cannot ignore Hamas’s rocket bombardment of its territory. But neither can Israel obliterate Gaza by inflicting a World War II-level of destruction, the amount of pain that might be required to permanently change the behavior of surviving Gazans.
Mr. Boot’s essay gets a double-ration from me because his point about strategic dilemmas in the modern age applies not just to Israel but to any Western power, especially the United States, which finds itself in similar circumstances. The West’s ability to respond to threats, provocations, and attacks is limited by what its electorates, informed by the mainstream media, are willing to bear. In today’s world, the political limits on responses provide significant constraints on policymakers.
In Iraq, the Coalition faced foolish and inexperienced opponents. Al Qaeda in Iraq and the most determined of the Sunni-Arab insurgents seemed to make little effort to win over the indigenous population to their side. In al Qaeda’s case, its medieval approach positively alienated what should have been its prime base of support. The Mahdi Army did try to enlist indigenous support, but still acted rashly. The U.S. was fortunate to have had such dimwitted opponents. Even so, the U.S. and its allies came very close to losing the war.
The next stop for Max Boot’s Dilemma will be Afghanistan. There, the Coalition faces a much smarter and more experienced adversary. The Taliban are competing fiercely with the Afghan government and the Coalition for the support of the population. The Taliban have an effective sanctuary in tribal Pakistan. The Taliban have much greater media-savvy than did al Qaeda or the Mahdis. The Afghan government is poor, suffers from weak management, and lacks the capacity to meet the population’s expectations. Finally, the Coalition may face a growing logistics problem.
This year, the U.S. will deploy more than 20,000 additional general purpose soldiers to the Afghan challenge. One of the purposes of these additional troops is to implement a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy. Although events in Iraq (and elsewhere) support the wisdom of this approach, U.S. casualty rates during the initial phases are likely to be painful. We should expect the clever Taliban to manage this opportunity to their advantage.
We will witness additional “horns” growing on Mr. Boot’s original two-horn dilemma. The “horns of the dilemma” will soon include:
1. The U.S. will have to do something about the terror sanctuary in the Afghan-Pakistan theater. In addition, it cannot accept the collapse of the constitutional government in Kabul.
2. As Max Boot suggests, the U.S. cannot use obliteration to achieve victory.
3. In 2009 and beyond, casualty rates among U.S. general purpose forces in Afghanistan may be too high for the U.S. public to tolerate.
4. The U.S. won’t be able to turn the fight over to either the Afghan or Pakistani governments any time soon.
5. Supplying much larger U.S. and Afghan forces may require the U.S. to make foreign policy concessions to Russia in order to open up a new supply route to Afghanistan through Central Asia.
Generalizing away from the Afghan situation, policy planners in the U.S. and the West must devise methods of solving critical irregular warfare problems in ways that have long run political sustainability. The political sustainability of Operation Iraqi Freedom was in doubt in 2006 and 2007. In the eleventh hour, the U.S. was spared by the incompetence of its opponents in Iraq. There is a reasonable chance that the political sustainability of the campaign in Afghanistan will come into question by the end of this year.
As Mr. Boot suggests, electorates won’t tolerate either passivity or wanton obliteration. Neither will they tolerate month after month of significant casualties among general purpose soldiers. And statesmen may resist forfeiting diplomatic leverage as a payment to some irregular warfare goals. What remains is for strategists in the West to devise a model for fighting irregular wars that works.
Max Boot has identified two horns of Israel’s strategic dilemma. That same dilemma also applies to the U.S. and other Western powers. And the dilemma has many more than two horns.
Mr. Boot’s essay gets a double-ration from me because his point about strategic dilemmas in the modern age applies not just to Israel but to any Western power, especially the United States, which finds itself in similar circumstances. The West’s ability to respond to threats, provocations, and attacks is limited by what its electorates, informed by the mainstream media, are willing to bear. In today’s world, the political limits on responses provide significant constraints on policymakers.
In Iraq, the Coalition faced foolish and inexperienced opponents. Al Qaeda in Iraq and the most determined of the Sunni-Arab insurgents seemed to make little effort to win over the indigenous population to their side. In al Qaeda’s case, its medieval approach positively alienated what should have been its prime base of support. The Mahdi Army did try to enlist indigenous support, but still acted rashly. The U.S. was fortunate to have had such dimwitted opponents. Even so, the U.S. and its allies came very close to losing the war.
The next stop for Max Boot’s Dilemma will be Afghanistan. There, the Coalition faces a much smarter and more experienced adversary. The Taliban are competing fiercely with the Afghan government and the Coalition for the support of the population. The Taliban have an effective sanctuary in tribal Pakistan. The Taliban have much greater media-savvy than did al Qaeda or the Mahdis. The Afghan government is poor, suffers from weak management, and lacks the capacity to meet the population’s expectations. Finally, the Coalition may face a growing logistics problem.
This year, the U.S. will deploy more than 20,000 additional general purpose soldiers to the Afghan challenge. One of the purposes of these additional troops is to implement a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy. Although events in Iraq (and elsewhere) support the wisdom of this approach, U.S. casualty rates during the initial phases are likely to be painful. We should expect the clever Taliban to manage this opportunity to their advantage.
We will witness additional “horns” growing on Mr. Boot’s original two-horn dilemma. The “horns of the dilemma” will soon include:
1. The U.S. will have to do something about the terror sanctuary in the Afghan-Pakistan theater. In addition, it cannot accept the collapse of the constitutional government in Kabul.
2. As Max Boot suggests, the U.S. cannot use obliteration to achieve victory.
3. In 2009 and beyond, casualty rates among U.S. general purpose forces in Afghanistan may be too high for the U.S. public to tolerate.
4. The U.S. won’t be able to turn the fight over to either the Afghan or Pakistani governments any time soon.
5. Supplying much larger U.S. and Afghan forces may require the U.S. to make foreign policy concessions to Russia in order to open up a new supply route to Afghanistan through Central Asia.
Generalizing away from the Afghan situation, policy planners in the U.S. and the West must devise methods of solving critical irregular warfare problems in ways that have long run political sustainability. The political sustainability of Operation Iraqi Freedom was in doubt in 2006 and 2007. In the eleventh hour, the U.S. was spared by the incompetence of its opponents in Iraq. There is a reasonable chance that the political sustainability of the campaign in Afghanistan will come into question by the end of this year.
As Mr. Boot suggests, electorates won’t tolerate either passivity or wanton obliteration. Neither will they tolerate month after month of significant casualties among general purpose soldiers. And statesmen may resist forfeiting diplomatic leverage as a payment to some irregular warfare goals. What remains is for strategists in the West to devise a model for fighting irregular wars that works.
Max Boot has identified two horns of Israel’s strategic dilemma. That same dilemma also applies to the U.S. and other Western powers. And the dilemma has many more than two horns.
posted by Westhawk at 5:58 PM
4 Comments:
I think Max Boot is missing the point or thinks we here in Israel are not cognizant of the complications in the situation. We know that the current operation will not have an Appomattox or Deck of the Missouri moment. In spite of what some commentators are saying, we are not doing this to "destroy Hamas." The Israeli government and the IDF is aware of this. We are not going to re-occupy Gaza. In fact, we just left in 2005.
The aim of Operation Lead Cast is, simply put, is to make hurt. This little war is similar to the type of operations the IDF used to carry out in the 1950s and 60s; they were called Pe'ulot Tagmul. Basically, the government would wait until the level of terrorism became politically unacceptable. With the public's patience used up, the army would be sent across the border to trash a military or civilian target. This would cause the relevant Arab authorities to take steps that would rein in the terrorists until the pressure on them would reach the level where some sort of terror attack became necessary. Please note that these activities took place before the Six Day War and the various Occupations. Our other model is the Second Lebanese War of 2006, where, in spite of not achieving our stated objective of "destroying the Hizbullah," the northern border has remained quiet ever since, due mostly to the massive amount of damage inflicted "unproportionally" on Lebanon.
Here the situation is complicated by the fact that the Gaza Strip is run by a radical Islamic Jihadist movement that is dedicated to Israel's destruction. Nonetheless, even Hamas can read the map. They are getting absolutely no help. Not from the Arab states. Not from Europe. Not from the Islamic countries. Not from Hezbollah. Even the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank is doing sweet F.A. to help their compatriots. With the destruction of their infrastructure, the decimation of their leadership and the general devastation visited on Gaza's unfortunate inhabitants, Hamas will be forced to accept a Lebanese-style cease fire that will include a certain level of foreign monitoring to enforce the terms. The rockets will have to cease when it comes into force and the blockade will slowly be lifted. This is, in theory, the objective. We are going to kill as many terrorists as we can and trash their infrastructure so badly that the next time they feel like launching rockets at our towns and kibbutzim, the Hamas leadership will pause and think "Well, maybe not today." The objective is not victory or even peace. The objective is the longest possible period of quiet until the next round. The harder we hit them, the longer that period will be.
To take a different example than the thugs running Gaza -- international shipping is being disrupted by a small group of criminals operating out of the failed state of Somalia.
Even the French navy acting alone could take care of the problem in an afternoon -- by destroying the shore bases and ignoring any collateral damage, including to hostages. Instead, many of the world's navies participate in a game where the pirates are allowed safe havens and continued piracy.
Why? The answer has to be in the excessive fear on the part of Western governments of bad publicity and international ambulance-chasing lawyers.
Yet those are factors that can change. Already, we can see that the usual Palestinian media operation is getting tuned out, compared even to just a few years ago. And the UN has lost all but the barest shreds of credibility. Change the laws, and those international lawyers go away.
There is a tide in the affairs of men -- and it may be that the tide will increasingly be running against the timidity which has crippled the West and made life much more unpleasant for non-Western people in Darfur, Zimbabwe, and elsewhere.
In short, maybe this self-imposed Western strategic dilema will simply fade away in the coming years.
The Thunder Run has linked to this post in the - Web Reconnaissance for 01/09/2009 A short recon of what’s out there that might draw your attention, updated throughout the day...so check back often.
The Alternative Westhawk is simply nuking most of the Pushtun Taliban (and perhaps Pakistan) out of existence.
Eventually, it may come to that, particularly if the concession, big speech, surrender instincts of Obama lead to disaster and the sort of Chosin Reservoir environment in Pakistan.
Don't forget, we can always nuke our way out of a problem. Half of Afghanistan and Pakistan dead? No problem.
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